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Torts-Strict Liability-A MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO WARN DOES NOT
EXTEND TO ELECTRICAL INJURIES-Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill.2d
456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
Recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois has refused to extend the
doctrine of strict liability to electricity. In Genaust v. Illinois Power Co.,'
the court narrowed the concept of strict liability by excluding electricity
from those products considered to be in a marketable state which have
been released into the stream of commerce, and by limiting the require-
ment of a duty to warn.
Ben Genaust was injured while installing a citizen's band radio an-
tenna in proximity to overhead electrical wires.' Although there was no
direct contact with the wires, Genaust sustained severe burns when an
electrical arc3 from the wires was conducted through the radio antenna.
An action based on strict liability was brought against the manufactur-
ers of the electricity' and the manufacturers of the radio antenna and
its metal support tower.5 The trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action The dismissal was upheld on appeal.7
1. 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
2. The wires were alleged to have been power transmission wires containing 12,500
volts. Brief for Appellant at 9, Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d
465 (1976).
3. An electrical arc is a sustained movement of electrons from one point to another in
the shape of a curved line formed when a break is made in an electrical circuit. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 110 (3d ed. 1968).
4. The wires were alleged to be in an unreasonably dangerous condition because they
were uninsulated and were located too close to the ground. 62 Ill.2d at 461, 343 N.E.2d at
468.
5. The alleged defect of the product asserted against Rohn Tower Manufacturing Co.,
Lurtz Electric Co., and Hy-Gain Electronics, as manufacturers and sellers of the radio-
antenna unit, was a failure to adequately warn of the danger of electrocution by electricity
traveling from overhead wires through space to the radio antenna and tower. Id. at 465,
343 N.E.2d at 470.
6. All counts were dismissed except a negligence count against the power company.
Id. at 460, 343 N.E.2d at 467.
7. The appellate court applied Section 388 of the Second Restatement of Torts in
holding that no duty to warn was required of the manufacturers of the antenna and
support tower. Section 388 states:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by
a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
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The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.'
The court observed that the electricity was in an unmarketable state
and never entered the stream of commerce. It held that the doctrine of
strict liability did not apply since the "product" never left the manufac-
turer's control and was not sold to the consumer.' The strict liability
counts against the manufactuers of the radio antenna and support tower
were dismissed on the basis that no duty to warn was required. The
court stated that a duty to warn is not required when the product manu-
factured is not defective and the injury results from a common pro-
pensity of the product that is open and obvious."0 In the present case, it
was not "objectively reasonable"" that the manufacturer would antici-
pate any individual being so careless as to place the antenna-tower unit
near the overhead power wires.'" This case note will examine the court's
rationale, the decision in relation to the theory of strict liability in tort,
and the ramifications of this decision in Illinois.
Strict liability was first imposed upon manufacturers in Illinois in
Suvada v. White Motor Co. '3 The court in Suvada abolished the require-
ment of privity'4 and set forth three requirements for application of
strict liability to manufacturers. The requirements are: 1) that there be
a sale of a defective product by the manufacturer; 2) that a defect
existed when the product left the manufacturer; and 3) that the injury
resulted from the dangerous condition created by the defect.'" In gen-
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §388 (1965).
8. 62 1Il.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
9. Id. at 465, 343 N.E.2d at 470.
10. Id. at 467, 343 N.E.2d at 471.
11. Id. at 466, 343 N.E.2d at 471, citing Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1
(1974).
12. Id. at 466, 343 N.E.2d at 471.
13. 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). The Illinois Supreme Court abolished privity
and negligence as absolute requirements in product liability claims and imposed strict
liability in tort as a means of determining ultimate responsibility. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
14. In Illinois, contractual privity was required before Suvada. The general rule of non-
liability to consumers of a product not in contractual privity was first developed from dicta
in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The reason for requiring privity
was that the manufacturer could not foresee any injuries beyond the immediate purchaser.
The requirement of privity, which limited the number of actions that could be brought
against the manufacturer, was abolished in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). MacPherson rejected the Winterbottom rationale and imposed
a duty on the manufacturer to exercise due care and to inspect the product. Id. at 393-94,
111 N .E. at 1054-55. The court in Suvada traced the historical erosion of privity in product
liability cases and announced its abolition in Illinois. 32 Ill.2d at 615-16, 210 N.E.2d at
184.
15. 32 11.2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188. The court fully accepted Section 402A of the
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eral, Illinois courts have accepted the Suvada decision and have devel-
oped the elements in light of the purposes of the doctrine.'"
However, application of strict liability to electricity has not been
adjudicated previously in Illinois. Other jurisdictions addressing the
issue have rejected application of the doctrine to electricity on the basis
that there was no sale 7 or defect." In Genaust, the plaintiff argued that
the electricity sold by Illinois Power Co. was a product and that the lack
of insulation rendered the product defective and unreasonably danger-
ous when it left the control of Illinois Power. However, the court re-
Restatement as the strict liability criteria. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
16. Following Suvada, a trend toward expanding the scope of strict liability developed.
Liability under the theory was extended to sellers of the product, as well as manufacturers.
Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill.App.2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1st Dist. 1969).
Courts provided greater protection to the consumer by: 1) holding the manufacturer to
the knowledge and skill of experts, Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill.App.2d 133,
237 N.E.2d 759 (1st Dist. 1968); 2) requiring that the manufacturer know the technical
advances in his field, id.; 3) requiring the manufacturer to install safety devices, Rivera
v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill.App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1st Dist. 1971); 4)
disallowing as a defense, the inability to detect defects before injury occurs, Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). Further, the plaintiff
is not required to prove freedom from contributory negligence, Williams v. Brown Mfg.
Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), or a specific defect as a prerequisite to recovery.
Larson v. Thomashow, 17 Ill.App.3d 308, 307 N.E.2d 707 (1st Dist. 1974). Only two recent
Illinois cases, Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974), and Rios v. Niagara
Mach. & Tool Works, 59 Ill.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974), indicate a diversion from the
trend of extending the doctrine of strict liability. Rios limited the doctrine by holding that
a manufacturer has no duty to install a safety device where the purchaser has taken it
upon himself to install a safety device. For a discussion of Rios, see Note, Strict Liability:
An Unwarranted Limitation Upon the Manufacturer's Duty to Produce a Reasonably Safe
Product-Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 533 (1976).
17. See Kemp v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 44 Wis.2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969)
(strict liability not applicable because electricity was not sold and was still in the control
of the power company).
18. See Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Co-op, 505 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(strict liability not applicable because no defect in electricity was alleged). See also Wood
v. Public Serv. Co., 114 N.H. 182, 317 A.2d 576 (1974) (no urgent reason to extend strict
liability to electricity).
19. 62 Ill.2d at 464, 343 N.E.2d at 470.
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fused to hold the power company strictly liable, stating that the electric-
ity was not in a marketable state and was not released into the stream
of commerce."0 Thus, the court found that there was no sale giving rise
to application of strict liability.2
The second issue addressed by the court was whether the manufactur-
ers of the antenna-tower unit were under a duty to warn against the
possibility of electrical arcing." The manufacturer's burden of adequate
warning is well established in Illinois,23 and the failure to warn may
constitute a defect for purposes of strict liability." A duty to warn exists
where there is unequal knowledge, actual or constructive, and the defen-
dant knows or should have known that injury could occur if no warning
is given.25 A manufacturer is not held to hindsight as a gauge of foreseea-
20. Id. at 465, 343 N.E.2d at 470.
21. The court specifically declined to hold that electricity was not a product. 62 Ill.2d
at 463, 343 N.E.2d at 469. Assuming there is a sale, for example, to a consumer in his
home, it could be argued that electricity should qualify as a product. By way of analogy,
electricity bears close resemblance to other products in which the manufacturer has been
held strictly liable. The doctrine has been held to apply to natural gas, Pioneer Hi-Bred
Corn Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 Ill.App.3d 638, 306 N.E.2d 337 (3d Dist. 1973)
(improper or fluctuating pressures in natural gas supplied to consumer constituted a
defect under strict liability), and to human blood furnished by a hospital, Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) (patient contracted
serum hepatitus from blood transfusion during medical treatment). These products bear
little resemblance to the typical range of products which consumers traditionally pur-
chase. However, the public policy rationale of placing the financial burden for defective
products on manufacturers is fully applicable.
22. 62 Ill.2d at 465, 343 N.E.2d at 470. A third issue presented to the court was whether
Hubert Plumbing & Heating Co. was liable as owner of the premises under a business
invitee theory of negligence. This issue was dismissed by the court and will not be dis-
cussed in this casenote.
23. See Biller v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34 IlI.App.2d 47, 180 N.E.2d 46 (2d Dist.
1962) (notwithstanding that a product is made properly, a manufacturer who knows that
a product is imminently or inherently dangerous when used in its customary manner must
exercise care to warn of such a danger). See also Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill.App.2d
334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (5th Dist. 1968); Kirby v. General Paving Co., 86 Ill.App.2d 453, 229
N.E.2d 777 (4th Dist. 1967).
24. It is well settled that the lack of adequate warning renders the product "defective."
See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories,Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill.App.2d
334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (5th Dist. 1968). See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, Comment j at 352 (1965).
25. See Weiss v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 9 Ill.App.3d 906, 293 N.E,2d 375 (1st Dist. 1973)
(strict liability action); Kirby v. General Paving Co., 86 Ill.App.2d 453, 229 N.E.2d 777
(4th Dist. 1973) (strict liability action); Hamilton v. Faulkner, 80 Ill.App.2d 159, 224
N.E.2d 304 (4th Dist. 1967) (property action); Herington v. Illinois Power Co., 79
IlI.App.2d 431, 223 N.E.2d 729 (4th Dist. 1967) (negligence action). The purpose of a
warning is to apprise a party of a danger which he is not aware, and thus enable him to
protect himself against it. Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 16 Ill.App.3d 339, 306
[Vol. 26:401
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bility; rather, he may be liable if the injury is likely to be serious and
the burden of adequate precaution is small. 6
The court in Genaust found that the injury resulted from a common
propensity of the product that was readily apparent; thus, no duty to
warn was required. 27 It is clear that the dangers of electricity are obvious
and fully appreciated. 21 However, the court should not have assumed
that electricity arcing between two metal conductors spaced a consider-
able distance apart is necessarily a known hazard.
2
The question of electrical arcing as a known occurrence had been
addressed previously in Stilfield v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Co."'
In deciding an issue of contributory negligence, the court in Stilfield
stated:
Plaintiff appears to have had, as so many persons have, only the nebu-
lous notion that electric wires are generally dangerous and direct con-
tact with them is to be avoided. [However] [pilaintiff had no
knowledge that . . . electricity would arc when a metal object was
placed within 3 or 4 feet of the wire . . ..
Thus, the court in Stilfield indicated that electrical arcing is not a
known, obvious danger.2 The question whether the danger is generally
known and recognized necessarily involves a determination of the
N.E.2d 312 (2d Dist. 1973). Statistically small chances or remote possibilities do not
eliminate a duty to warn. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
26. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill.App.2d 334, 361, 236 N.E.2d 125, 139 (5th
Dist. 1968).
27. The law does not require that a manufacturer warn against mishaps resulting from
common propensities of products. See Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill.2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182
(1967) (injuries sustained from slippery shoes in strict liability action); Jonescue v. Jewel
Home Shopping Serv., 16 Ill.App.3d 339, 306 N.E.2d 312 (2d Dist. 1973r(injuries sus-
tained when child drank toxic household cleaner); Wallinger v. Martin Stamping & Stove
Co., 93 Ill.App.2d 437, 236 N.E.2d 755 (3d Dist. 1968) (carbon monoxide poisoning re-
sulted from improper installation of gas heater); Withey v. Illinois Power Co., 32
Ill.App.2d 163, 177 N.E.2d 254 (2d Dist. 1961) (injuries sustained in fall from television
tower).
28. Genaust admitted in his pleadings that contact with electricity is a known danger.
The court must accept the factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss
the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from those facts.
Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill.2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973); In re Hansen, 109 Ill.App.2d 283,
248 N.E.2d 709 (1st Dist. 1969).
29. See Stilfield v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 25 Ill.App.2d 478, 167 N.E.2d 295 (2d
Dist. 1960); Burk v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 420 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1967);
Black v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 56 N.J. 63, 265 A.2d 129 (1970).
30. 25 Ill.App.2d 478, 167 N.E.2d 295 (2d Dist. 1960) (in negligence action, workman
not held to knowledge of electricity arcing from overhead wires to crane).




knowledge common to the ordinary consumers of the product.3 The
experience and ability of forseeable users will vary greatly; a product
which might be used safely by one individual may prove to be lethal in
the hands of another." Thus, reasonable persons could differ on the
question of electrical arcing and the complaint in Genaust should not
have been dismissed on the basis that the danger was obvious.
Since the injury resulted from a common propensity, the court in
Genaust held that it was not reasonable that the manufacturers would
foresee this type of injury.3" This examination of the manufacturer's
expectations is misplaced. Strict liability arises from a condition of the
product, not the subjective expectations of the manufacturer. 6 The pro-
per test in resolving a duty to warn issue is whether the danger is gener-
ally known and recognized by the reasonable person."
The court based its determination of duty on a foreseeability test.3
While it is true that underlying any determination of a duty is the issue
of forseeability, 31 the existence of a duty does not depend upon forseea-
bility alone. The seriousness of the injury and the magnitude of the
burden of guarding against it must also be taken into account.' How-
ever, the court in Genaust ignored these two vital factors. It could be
argued that installation of equipment in proximity to electrical wires is
analogous to inherently dangerous activities, such as the handling of
explosives." Therefore, the serious nature of the activity and the gravity
of the potential harm 2 give rise to a duty to warn. Also, the fact that
33. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill.App.2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (5th Dist. 1968);
Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill.App.2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1st Dist. 1964).
35. 62 Ill.2d at 466, 343 N.E.2d at 471.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
37. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974).
38. Technically, the doctrine of foreseeability and the scope of duty have no place in
strict liability. However, in duty to warn cases, the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove
the existence of a duty as a prerequisite to strict liability. See Rios v. Niagara Mach. &
Tool Works, 59 I1.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974). See also Turkington, Foreseeability and
Duty Issues in Illinois Torts; Constitutional Limitations to Defamation Torts Under
Gertz, 23 DEPAuL L. REV. 243 (1975).
39. Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill.2d 539, 306 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
40. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (damage to barge
resulting from unsecured lines in foul weather); Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (children injured by explosion resulting from blasting
caps); Lance v. Senior, 36 I1.2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 (1967) (hemophiliac injured by a
needle ingested into lung tissue); Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill.App.2d
315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (4th Dist. 1967) (blindness caused by chips from face of defective
hammer); Kay v. Ludwick, 87 Ill.App.2d 114, 230 N.E.2d 494 (4th Dist. 1967) (four-year-
old injured by rotary mower in operation):
41. See Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
42. It is well-settled in Illinois that electricity is a silent, deadly and dangerous agency.
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the burden of adequate precaution is relatively slight supports an impo-
sition of a duty to warn. A warning label attached to a component part
of the antenna-tower unit would be a simple, inexpensive method of
warning and would give the consumer actual knowledge of any dangers
involved in the use of the product. 3 By use of a foreseeability test alone,
the court is narrowing the scope of the manufacturer's duty to warn.
In refusing to allow strict liability counts to stand against the manu-
facturers of the antenna-tower unit, the court ignored the foundation
and policy reasons behind the doctrine of strict liability. The doctrine
of strict liability is a judicial response to a public interest in preserving
human life and health, and to public policy considerations of protecting
the consumer. In light of these policies, the court should have com-
pared the gravity of an injury from electrical arcing with the slight
burden of adequate precaution. Since the manufacturer is in the best
position to anticipate these accidents and the reasonable person's
knowledge is disputed, the policy of consumer protection would have
been better served if a duty to warn was imposed. Therefore, the failure
to warn should have been classified as a defect for purposes of strict
liability."
See, e.g., Merlo v. Public Serv. Co., 381 Ill. 300, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1942); Austin v. Public
Serv. Co., 299 I1. 112, 132 N.E. 458 (1921); Hausler v. Commonwealth Elec. Co., 240 Ill.
201, 88 N.E. 561 (1909); Rowe v. Taylorville Elec. Co., 213 Ill. 318, 72 N.E. 711 (1904);
Floyd v. Galva Elec. Light Co., 227 Ill.App. 541 (2d Dist. 1923); Martens v. Public Serv.
Co., 219 Ill.App. 160 (2d Dist. 1920). Contact with overhead electrical wires often results
in death by electrocution. See, e.g., Clinton v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 36 IIl.App.3d
1064, 344 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1976) (minor electrocuted when aluminum pole struck
overhead wire containing 7200 volts). The degree of danger involved with electricity is
comparable to the operation of a firing range or handling of explosives. See Spence v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 34 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1067, 340 N.E.2d 550, 556 (1st Dist. 1975);
Mullen v. Chicago Transit Auth., 33 Ill.App.2d 103, 113, 178 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1st Dist.
1961).
43. Legislators have recognized the advantages of warning labels and have imposed
warning label requirements on manufacturers of other types of products. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §1333 (1970) (health warnings required on cigarette packages).
44. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970);
Krammer v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 16 Ill.App.3d 763, 306 N.E.2d 686 (4th Dist.
1971); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill.App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (4th Dist.
1971); Texaco v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill.App.2d 357, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1st Dist. 1969).
The justification for strict liability is that the seller, in marketing his product, assumes
the responsibility to the consuming public and must bear the burden of injuries resulting
from the product's use. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, Comment c at 349-50
(1965). The imposition of strict liability does not require a manufacturer to guarantee that
his product is free from all injury, nor is he required to become an absolute insurer of his
product. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). The
manufacturer is under a duty of reasonable care in designing and manufacturing his
product, Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 59 Ill.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974), and is
required to adequately warn of foreseeable dangers to intended users, Dunham v. Vaughn
& Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill.App.3d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (4th Dist. 1967).
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The legitimate conclusions to be drawn from Genaust are speculative
in nature. However, one conclusion is that the Illinois Supreme Court
is continuing to take a restrictive attitude toward product liability
claims. This trend began in Winnett v. Winnett," in which the court
held that a bystander was not an intended user and not foreseeable as
a matter of law. Thus, in Genaust as in Winnett, the scope of duty has
been restricted by use of a foreseeability test. This desire to limit the
number of strict liability actions was also indicated in Rios v. Niagara
Machine and Tool Works." The court in Rios held that once a purchaser
of a product installs a safety device thereon, any unreasonably danger-
ous condition that existed due to the lack of such device was no longer
present. Thus, the manufacturer was not liable for failure to install a
safety device.
The future role of foreseeability in duty to warn cases is a major
concern. It is likely that foreseeability will become the only factor which
will determine whether there is a duty to warn. Courts will not consider
the seriousness of the injury or the burden of precaution. 7 The decision
may impede the development and expansion of the manufacturer's duty
to warn. Closer scrutiny must be given to the duty of the manufacturer
in future cases as modern and rapid advances in technology result in the
production of highly sophisticated products. Many consumers will lack
the experience, skill and knowledge necessary to fully comprehend the
dangerous propensities of the products and must be made aware of the
possible dangers resulting from their use. In this respect, the courts
should be the vanguard of the public to minimize the adverse effects of
a narrowed scope of the duty to warn."
Jeffrey Kripton
Discovery-Testing-PARTIALLY DESTRUCTIVE TESTING is WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THE ILLINOIS DISCOVERY RuLES-Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hard-
ware, Inc., 63 Ill.2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
In Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc.,' the Illinois Supreme Court
45. 57 Ill.2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (injury to child resulting when her hands were placed
in a conveyor belt, held not foreseeable on a motion to dismiss).
46. 12 Ill.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974).
47. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
48. For an overview concerning other types of defects in strict liability, see Hofeld,
Looking At a Decade of Product Liability Law in Illinois- Where We've Been and Where
We're Going, 64 ILL. B.J. 344 (1976); Pope & Pope, Design Defects Cases: The Present
State of Illinois Product Liability Law, 8 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 351 (1975).
1. 63 Ill.2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
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